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39 ABSTRACT 
The  paper provides an overview of regulatory frameworks  for employee  workplace 
participation in Western Europe.  "Participation" is,  in this context,  defined 
narrowly  as  participative schemes  which  have  a  general  and  formal  character, 
including statutory and collective agreements for employee participation through 
works councils and similar bodies as well as through employee representation on 
company  boards. 
The  introductorv part of  the paper discusses  the concept  of participation and 
the fact  that different actors  - the management  and  labour or the legislative 
authorities - have different views on the objectives of employee participation. 
Part  two  describes  and  analyses  the  general  frameworks  for  employee 
participation  in  Western  Europe,  i.e.  the  regulatory  frameworks  on  works 
councils and employee board-level  representation.  In outlining the different 
frameworks,  attention is paid to the nature of employee  involvement as well  as 
to the moment  and duration of participation.  In the final sections of part two, 
employee participation in 3 specific issue areas is described:  with respect to 
workplace health and safety,  regarding the introduction of new  technology,  and 
with respect to employees'  financial  involvement  in their company  ("financial 
participation") . 
Part three describes European Community  legislation and initiatives in the field 
of  employee  participation.  Some  relevant  legislation  exists,  but  most 
initiatives  have  been  blocked  by  fundamental  disagreement  among  the  Member 
States and between the management  and  labour.  However,  recently,  the question 
of employee participation has come  to the fore again,  primarily in the form  of 
the renewed proposal  for a  European Company  Statute,  the proposal for European 
Works  Councils  in Community-scale  undertakings and  the proposal  for  a  Council 
Recommendation concerning the promotion of employee participation inprofits and 
enterprise results. 
The  final  sections  of  part  three  deal  briefly  with  European  Community 
legislation and initiatives with respect to employee participation in health and 
safety at work  and the introduction of new  technology.  Thus,  the participative 
elements  of  the  1989  framework  directive  on  workplace  health  and  safety  are 
described and the "Val Duchesse" dialogue between the management  and labour and 
the conclusions of these talks on the introduction of new  technology is touched 
upon. 
- 5  -- 6  -PART  ONE:  INTRQDUCTION 
1.1  Employee participation in Western Europe: national and European frameworks 
This paper describes a  number of practices of employee participation.  The  first 
part  enlarges  on  the  concept  of  participation  and  describes  and  analyses 
employee  participation  schemes  in  a  number  of  Western  European  states.  The 
focus will firstly be on the existing general  forms  of participation,  secondly 
on specific participative schemes concerning three different issue areas: health 
and safety at work,  introduction of new  technology and financial participation. 
The  second part of the paper concentrates on initiatives and legislation of the 
European  Community  in the  field of  employee  participation.  In outlining the 
different  attempts  at  E.C.  level  legislation  the  paper  directs  particular 
attention  to  the  positions  of  the  employers  and  trade  unions  as  well  as  to 
recent developments  in the area. 
1.2  The  concept of participation 
The  basis of  the concept  of participation is the division of responsibilities 
between  managers  and  labour.  The  task  of  the  manager  is  said  to  be  the 
conceptualization of the production process  (such as the formulation of company 
strategy,  the  choice  of  the  product  range,  and  the  outlay  of  the  production 
process).  The  task of the worker is said to be the execution of work.  Workers' 
participation  relates  to  the  degree  to  which  this  division  of  labour  is 
overcome.  In other  words:  the question  on  worker  participation concerns  the 
degree to which workers  take part in the management  of production of  goods  and 
services. 
However,  the concept of participation becomes more problematic when  the concrete 
meaning  and  purpose  of  participative  forms  is  delineated.  Thus,  since 
participation  cannot  be  dissociated  from  questions  of  power,  authority, 
legitimacy and control,  it inevitably has  a  highly political aspect.  In some 
national  settings participation is  seen  as  a  method  of  installing industrial 
democracy,  and  as  a  necessary corrective that extends  the rights conferred by 
political democracies into the industrial area.  At  the point at which political 
argument  begins,  however,  participation  and  its definition  is  shaped  by  the 
conflict  of  interests  between  the  management  and  labour  reflecting  basic 
differences  in  the  views  on  how  industry  should  operate  and  about  how  human 
activity should be regulated.  Thus  the term  'participation' is not politically 
neutral and it encompasses  many  different and conflicting stances. 
1.2.1  Participation:  different meaning  for different actors 
The  actors  in  the  discussion  on  participation  are  normally  seen  to  be  the 
individual employee,  the union,  the management  and the legislative authorities. 
As  mentioned already,  these actors evidently have differing views  on  employee 
participation,  views  which  again  are  based  on  the  different  motives  of  each 
actor as he enters the discussion.
1 
The  following  account  is based  on  The  European  Foundation  for  the 
Improvement  of Living and Working  Conditions,  Participation review: 
a  review of Foundation studies on  participation,  Dublin  1988. 
- 7  -The  employee:  participation as  an  instrumental  process.  The  common  employee 
view  on  participation  is  that  the  process  is  a  direct  means  of  attaining 
concrete  benefits  in  terms  of  higher  pay,  more  agreeable  work  environment  1 
greater  responsibility  and  improved  protection  of  health  and  safety.  Wider 
problems  of  change  or  of  procedural  concerns  which  determine  the  power 
relationships are areas of  secondary  importance. 
The  trade union:  participation as an agent in redistributing power.  The  common 
union view supports  increased employee  participation in so far as it protects 
the interests of union members.  Unions also see participation as a  tool for the 
redistribution of power in providing access to decision making.  The  support for 
employee participation is, however,  not without reservation.  This is so for two 
reasons:  firstly,  the  form  of participation,  especially when  it is introduced 
by  management,  may  actually  increase  managerial  control  over  the  production 
process:  by  sharing  control  and  increasing  work  force  influence  on  specific 
functional  problems,  man&gement  at  the  same  time  appears  to  gain  more 
hierarchical  control  as  the  production  process  becomes  more  transparent  and 
workers  more  cooperative.  Secondly,  the  involvement  of  unions  in  decision 
making  may  at the same  time render them  more  responsible for the decisions and 
their  - sometimes  unexpected  - consequences,  such as  job  losses.  Here,  some 
unions are reluctant to take joint responsibility for organisational solutions 
which may  bring short-term benefits to their members  but which may  subse~uently 
constrain their freedom  of action and  their demands  as trade unionists. 
Management:  participation  as  a  means  for  increasing  efficiency.  Evidently, 
management's  primary  aim  is  the  increase  of  production  process  efficiency. 
Through employee participation,  management  may  obtain an increase in workforce 
motivation.  Participative schemes may  make  employees more responsible for their 
job and increase their commitment.  In this way,  managers  may  be able to gather 
more  and  better  information  about  the  ongoing  production  process,  an 
increasingly important point at a  time when  production processes are growing in 
complexity.  Further concrete benefits are the reduction of  costs  through  the 
minimisation of  waste,  enlargement  of  control,  and quality  improvement.  Less 
concrete consequences may  be the increase of production process flexibility, the 
stimulation of learning and general improvement of industrial relations.  Recent 
research argues  that work  organisational practices based on  the principles of 
division of work  and deskilling have already been counterproductive for a  long 
time and  are,  to an  increasing degree,  being replaced with more  participative 
schemes,  including schemes  where discipline is not  imposed  from  the outside.3 
Legislative authorities: participation as a  form of macro-regulation.  Concerned 
with socio-economic stability, political authorities may  promote participation 
as  a  way  of  regulating conflicting interests of social groups.  Participative 
structures  can  foster  cooperative  industrial  relations,  provide  a  stable 
economic  environment  and decrease  income  imbalances. 
2 
3 
Vittorio Di  Martino,  Participating in Technological Change,  European 
Foundation  for  the  Improvement  of  living  and  working  conditions, 
Dublin  1987. 
E.g.  w.  Buitelaar,  Technology  and  Work,  Gower,  Aldershot  1988,  H. 
Kern and M.  Schumann,  Das  Ende  der Arbei  tsteilung? Miinchen  1984 1  and 
P.  Brodner,  Strategic  Options  for  "New  Production  Systems"  1  Fast 
report  no.  150,  Commission  of  the  European  Communities~  Brussels 
1987. 
- 8  -1.2.2 Forms  of participation 
It is useful here to distinguish between different aspects of concrete employee 
participation.  The  first aspect is the regulatory framework,  consisting mostly 
of  governmental  regulations  and collective agreements.  Although a  regulatory 
framework does not guarantee automatically workers'  participation, it certainly 
may  provide the basic preconditions for participation to develop. 
Secondly,  a participative process concerns a certain subject matter.  Issues can 
vary  from  job-related,  primarily plant-based questions,  like workplace  health 
and  safety,  to  more  strategic  issues  on  the  enterprise  level  such  as  work 
reorganization or investment plans.  Particular forms  of participation tend to 
correspond to different categories of  issues. 
A third aspect of participation is the nature of emoloyee  involvement.  One  can 
distinguish progressively between no  involvement;  information provision;  right 
to collection of  information;  (admission  to  sources  of  information,  right  to 
carry out inspection,  interviews etc.),  right to consultation and negotiation, 
and  finally,  right  to  joint  decision  making.  Consultation  differs  from 
negotiation  in  the  sense  that  it normally  deals  with  questions  of  perceived 
common  interests whereas negotiation relates to problems  where  management  and 
labour  have  adversary  relationships.  In  terms  of  influence  on  management 
decision making,  consultation means  advising managers,  leaving their freedom in 
decision making  intact.  Negotiation is more  a  bargaining procedure where both 
parties have  to take into consideration each other's wishes.
4 
Finall_y,  the  level  of  involvement  depends  on  the  timing  and  duration  of 
participation: in what phase of a particular decision making process does labour 
become  involved?  Is it during the planning of a  decision,  during the selection 
of  a  path  of  change  or  during  the  implementation  of  the  change,  after  most 
important decisions have been made?  Different timing corresponds to different 
degrees of  involvement.  Disclosing information prior to decision making gives 
labour more  influence than information provision during decision making. 
In  the  following  sections  of  this  paper  different  participative  schemes  are 
described  and  analysed  with  attention  directed  to  these  four  aspects  of 
participation.  However,  since the nature of issue areas influences the type of 
participation,  this aspect of  participation will be  the dimension along which 
to  order  different  existing  schemes.  we  dist~nguish  between  employee 
participation  in  matters  of  health  and  safety  at  work  with  respect  to  the 
introduction of new  technology,  and financial participation, i.e. the employee's 
financial involvement in his workplace.  First, however,  the paper describes the 
general  frameworks  for  employee  participation in a  number  of  Western  European 
countries. 
The  analysis  of  different  forms  of  employee  participation  is  limited  to 
participative schemes which have a  formal  and general character,  i.e. statutory 
and  collective  agreement  provisions  for  employee  participation  through  works 
councils and similar bodies and  through the different  forms  of employee  board-
level  representation.  The  paper  does  not  deal  with  "direct"  employee 
4  R.  Blanpain,  F.  Blanquet,  F.  Herman,  and  A.  Mouty,  The  Vredeling 
Proposal:  Information and Consultation of Employees in Multinational 
Enterprises,  Kluwer,  Deventer  1983. 
- 9  -participation through management initiated workplace schemes,  just as collective 
bargaining in itself is not discussed in any detail. 
- 10  -PART  TWQ:  BATIQNAL  FRAMEWORKS  FOR  EMPLOYEE  PARTICIPATION 
2.1  General  frameworks  for  employee  participation:  work$  councils  and  board-
level representation 
What  are the typical characteristics of existing employee participation schemes 
in Western Europe  on states?  This is the question which will be  addressed in 
the following sections.
5 
2.1.1  Regulatory  framework 
Employee  participation  - be  it  in  the  form  of  legislation  or  collective 
agreement  - differs widely between the Western European states.  At  one extreme 
of  the  continuum  is  the  United  Kingdom  where  formal  regulation  of  general 
employee participation is virtually non-existent.  This does not,  however,  mean 
that workplace participation is non-existent:  a  1984  study found that 34%  of all 
workplaces in the  u.~. had a  joint consultative committee,  created on the basis 
of  local agreements. 
At  the  other  end  of  the  continuum  is  Germany  placed.  The  German  regulatory 
framework  constituted  primarily  by  the  Works  Constitution  Act 
(Betriebsverfassungsgesetz)  of  1972,  last  amended  in  1988,  and  the  1976  Co-
decision Act  (Mitbestimmungsgesetz)  - provides  the legal basis ior both works 
councils with relatively comprehensive rights and obligations and fer employee 
board-level representation and co-decision in certain areas. 
Works  councils 
In  most  Western  European  countries,  legislation  or  collective  agreements 
guarantees the existence of works councils.  The notable exceptions are Ireland, 
the United Kingdom,  Italy and Sweden.  In Sweden  and Italy,  regulation provides 
for  trade  unions  in  the  workplace  to  perform  many  of  the  functions  of  works 
councils  in other states  (in the case of  Sweden,  trade unions are  involved  in 
even more  areas  and  to a  greater extent  than is typical  for  works  councils  in 
other states),  whereas  this is not  the case in Ireland and the U.K. 
With  respect  to  the  establishment  of  works  councils,  German  legislation lays 
down  the  lowest  workforce  threshold  of  the  European  Community:  Employers  are 
obliged  to  set  up  works  councils  on  request  once  there  are  5  permanent 
employees.  Five is also the threshold in Austria.  In Denmark  the number is 35, 
in France and Spain 50,  and in Belgium  100.  In the Netherlands,  there is a  dual 
threshold:  a  company  with more  than  100  workers  has  a  works  council  with more 
powers  than a  company  with 35  employees.  In Greece,  ~ompanies may  (there is no 
legal obligation) establish works councils.  Portugal lays down  no  threshold at 
all. 
5 
6 
The  following  account  relies  primarily  on  European  Industrial 
Relations  Review  report  no.  4,  "Employee  participation in Europe", 
1990,  and European Trade Union Institute, "Workers representation and 
rights in the workplace in Western  Europe",  Brussels  1990. 
"British Workplace  Industrial Relations  1980-1984",  Gover  1986. 
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countries,  the  councils  comprise  employee  representatives  only.  However,  in 
Belgium,  Denmark  and  France,  employers'  representatives  form  a  part  of  the 
structure  as  well.  The  employer  chairs  the  meetings  in  France,  whereas  in 
Denmark  the  "group  A"  of  a  council  represents  "responsible  management  and 
technical  and supervisory staff ineligible for  trade union  membership".  With 
respect  to  the  size  of  works  councils,  Luxembourg  provides  no  regulations, 
whereas  in  Germany  it ranges  from  one  member  to  a  maximum  of  35.  In  other 
Western  European  states,  the  minimum  size  generally  ranges  from  3  to  6  with 
maximum  sizes set between  11  and  35. 
Board-level representation 
In  about  half  the  Western  European  countries,  there  is  a  form  of  statutory 
employee  representation  on  company  boards.7  Where  national  company  law 
provides for a  two-tier company  structure (i.e.  with a  supervisory board and a 
management  board),  employee  board-level  representation typically entails some 
representation  on  the  supervisory  board.  In  unitary  systems,  board-level 
participation entails representation on  the board of directors. 
Legislation and agreements covering board-level representation generally apply 
to companies  above  a  certain size or within  a  specified sector.  In Austria, 
regulation  on  employee  board-level  representation  applies  for  joint  stock 
corporations,  co-operatives,  and limited liability companies with more  than 30 
employees.  Similarly in Sweden,  regulation covers joint stock companies and co-
operatives,  and  in Denmark  limited liability companies  with a  workforce of  50 
or  more.  The  German  regulation of  1976  covers  joint stock  companies  with  an 
average  of  over  2000  employees.  For  companies  with  between  500  and  2000 
employees the older regulation applies.  Special regulation applies to companies 
in  the  iron,  steel  and  coal  industries  with  more  than  1  000  employees.  In 
France,  works  councils appoint  representatives to the board,  which  means  that 
regulation  applies  to  companies  with  more  than  50  employees.  In  Spain  and 
Ireland,  board-level  representation  is  restricted  to  certain  publicly  owned 
undertakings. 
With  respect  to  the  extent  of  employee  board-level  representation,  Austrian 
works  councils  may  delegate  a  third of  the  members  of  the  supervisory board. 
Danish employees are entitled to elect one third of the total membership of the 
supervisory  board.  In  Germany  employee  representatives  constitute  50%  of 
supervisory board membership under the 1976 legislation, i.e. for companies with 
more than 2000  employees.  This also applies to companies in the steel, coal and 
iron sectors.  For companies with a  workforce of 500-20.00,  employees appoint one 
third of  the supervisory board. 
In France,  works councils may  appoint representatives onto the management or the 
supervisory boards  (French companies  may  choose either a  unitary or a  two-tier 
board structure).  The  number  of representatives may,  however,  not exceed one 
third of  the total membership.  According to a  1987  act,  Swedish trade unions 
have the right to appoint two  members  of the board of  companies employing more 
than 24  workers  (in Sweden  a  unitary company  structure is the norm).  Spain and 
7  This  is  the  case  in  7  of  the  15  countries  covered  in  "Employee 
participation  in  Europe",  European  Industrial  Relations  Review, 
Report  No  4. 
- 12  -Ireland allow employees  to appoint  representatives to board subcommittees  and 
to boards of certain state owned  companies,  respectively. 
2.1.2 The  nature of employee  involvement 
The different Western European regulatory frameworks described above correspond 
to different degrees  and  types of employee  workplace  involvement. 
Works  councils 
With  respect  to the  works  councils existing in most  of  the countries  studied 
here,  the  main  function,  clearly,  is  to  serve  as  a  channel  for  information 
disclosure and consultation. 
Works  councils  have  specific  rights  to  information  covering  aspects  of 
financial,  economic,  and personnel policies.  Such rights may  be very genera·" 
as  in  France  where  the  employer  must  disclose  information  on  the  "global 
activities  of  the  undertaking".  On  the  other  hand,  Belgian  law  specifies 
detailed disclosure requirements,  including regular information on cost, pricing 
and budgeting,  financial stability,  and  the undertaking's scientific research. 
Somewhere  in between  is Austria,  where  works  councils probably enjoy  the most 
comprehensive  information rights outside the E.C.,  including general rights of 
information in relation to the company's situation, orders,  sales etc., and more 
specific  rights  in  relation  to  new  appointments,  including  their  proposed 
deployments,  pay,  grading,  and  probationary periods. 
Works  councils furthermore have the right to prior consultation - to be informed 
of planned measures  in advance  and given an opportunity to express  an opinion 
before  implementation.  The  type  of  issue  covered  by  right  to  consultation 
varies considerably,  but emphasis is usually placed on prior consultation both 
over  plans  affecting working  conditions  and  over  issues  affecting employment 
security,  such as closures,  mergers  and  relocations. 
The  negotiating  powers  of  works  councils  are  typically  limited.  In  Belgium, 
Denmark  and Luxembourg,  the works councils have no negotiating role.  In France 
and  Germany  negotiations are limited to a  number  of areas specified by  law:  in 
France,  for  example,  this covers  profit-sharing  and  share  ownership  schemes, 
while  in  Germany  the  list is  longer.  Negotiations  are  possible,  though  not 
included as  a  right,  in Portugal  and  the Netherlands.  In Greece  consultation 
and negotiation rights are applicable only in the absence of a  recognized union. 
Finally,  in  Spain  works  councils  are  fully  integrated  into  the  collective 
bargaining system and  may  conclude agreements  on  any  subject. 
Generally,  works councils have no  veto power.  However,  elements of co-decision 
are  found  in  Austria,  France,  Germany,  and  the  Netherlands.  In  France  co-
decision is restricted to a  relatively small area  (such as  the appointment  of 
the works  doctor),  while in the Netherlands it takes the form  of a  requirement 
of  the  council's  "assent"  to  changes  in  personnel  policy  and  employment 
security.  If  the  council  withholds  assent,  the  employer  must  appeal  to  an 
industrial commission before proceeding.  It is in Austria and Germany  that co-
decision is of  the greatest  importance.  In Germany,  the consent  of  the works 
council  is  required  with  respect  to  engagement,  grading,  regrading  and  the 
transfer  of  staff,  as  well  as  to  matters  such  as  pay  procedures,  the 
organisation of working time,  and generally "matters relating to the operation 
of  the establishment". 
- 13  -Board-level representation 
In  most  of  the  countries  with  regulations  on  employee  board-level 
representation,  employee  representatives  have  the  same  rights,  duties,  and 
responsibilities as other members  of the board.  This is the case for Austria, 
Germany,  Sweden,  Spain,  Ireland and  Denmark.  In  Denmark  and  Sweden  employee 
representatives  as  other  members  of  the  board  are  explicitly  bound  by 
confidentiality clauses,  which prevent them  from  informing employees on a  range 
of  "sensitive issues".  In France,  board-level representatives  in the private 
sector have no  right to vote. 
Since employee representatives generally constitute only a  minority on company 
boards,  the  real  extent  0f  employee  participation  may  not  go  much  beyond 
consultation and  information.  Germany  might  be an exception in this respect, 
as after the 1976 co-decision act employee representatives constitute 50%  of the 
members  of  the  supervisory  board  for  companies  with  over  2000  employees. 
However,  this scheme falls abort of full parity co-decision:  the chairman of the 
board,  who  is appointed by  shareholders,  has  a  double  vote  in the event  of  a 
tied  vote.  Full  parity  co-decision  in  Germany  is  found  exclusively  in  the 
mining,  iron and  steel sectors in companies  with more  than  1000  employees,  as 
according to the 1951  act on co-decision employees and shareholders each appoint 
50%  of  the  board  members,  and  an  additional  and  neutral  member  acts  as 
independent chairman. 
2.1.3 Timing  and duration of participation 
As  for the timing of works councils participation, statutory provisions usually 
specify the time and regularity with which information must  be provided.  These 
provisions  are  most  detailed  in  Belgium,  where  information  must  be  given  to 
works  councils  quarterly,  annually,  occasionally  (i.e.  whenever  a  particular 
need arises)  and each time a  works  council is set up. 
On  the  other  hand,  in  Germany,  Denmark  and  the  Netherlands  the  employer  is 
simply  under  a  duty  to  disclose  information  "in  good  time"  on  the  issues 
specified.  In some  cases,  works councils may  themselves trigger disclosure,  as 
in  Greece  where  works  councils  may  request  information  within  20  days.  In 
Austria employers are required to provide information about planned changes "as 
soon  as  possible".  This  includes  a  requirement  to  provide  such  information 
"sufficiently early to allow the works  councils to be consulted over the way  in 
which  the changes are made". 
Consultation by definition means exchanging views prior to decision being taken. 
Thus,  where regulation provides for the right to consultation, it also formally 
ensures  the  involvement of works  councils prior to decision making. 
Employee board-level representatives may  -where these representatives enjoy the 
same  rights as other  members  - be  assumed  to be  informed  of  and  involved  in 
decision making at the same  point of  time as other members. 
2.2  Em~oyee participation concerning health and safety at work 
The  issue of health and safety has been a  prime concern for unions and employees 
and  has been at the centre of negotiations  for  some  time:  in most countries, 
- 14  -the  relevant  legislation  was  introduced  in  the  1970s.  Obviously,  workers 
consider the issue of participation as  important,  since it affects immediately 
and visibly their working environment.  Also,  management  generally accepts the 
value  of  a  healthy  and  safe  workplace.  As  a  consequence  of  the  general 
consensus,  participative  structures  with  respect  to  health  and  safety  are 
reasonably  well  established,  and  the  legislation  of  all  Western  European 
countries  stipulates  relatively  comprehensive  rights  to  workers'  representa-
t .  8 
l.VeS. 
2.2.1  Regulatory  framework 
In the typical Western European regulatory framework,  the control of health and 
safety at work  is conducted either by  individual persons  appointed or elected 
from  the  workforce  - workers'  representatives  or  safety delegates  - or  by  a 
workplace health and safety committee or the general works  council. 
Thus,  the countries surveyed can be divided into three broad groups: 
In  Belgium,  Finland,  France,  Ireland,  Norway,  Denmark,  Sweden  and  the 
United  Kingdom,  rights  are  granted  exclusively  to  elected or  appointed 
safety  delegates  and/or  workers  representatives  on  health  and  safety 
committees. 
In Austria,  West-Germany,  Greece  and  Spain,  rights are granted to safety 
delegates and committees and to workers' representatives on work councils. 
In Italy,  Portugal and the Netherlands,  where  there are no  statutory hea-
lth  and  safety  committees,  all  rights  are  conferred  on  workers' 
representatives on  work  councils. 
The  establishment  of  both health and  safety committees  and  individual  safety 
delegates  normally  presupposes  a  certain company  size.  The  threshold varies 
from  100  employees  in  Spain  to  20  employees  in  Denmark,  Finland,  Greece  and 
Ireland for  the establishment of  the health and  safety committee,  and  from  50 
employees in Austria to 5 in Sweden  for a  safety delegate.  The  most  common  way 
to select workers'  health and  safety representatives is simply election by  and 
from  the  workforce.  However,  in  Belgium  election  is  made  from  trade  union 
lists, just as trade unions appoint the representatives in Sweden and the United 
Kingdom. 
Workers'  representatives normally enjoy special prote8tion against dismissal or 
discrimination.  Only  Ireland  provide  no  special  regulations.  In  most 
countries,  a  dismissal  has  to  be  approved  by  an  ~xternal  body.  In  other 
countries,  e.g.  in  Germany  and  in  Greece,  dismissal  of  representatives  is 
restricted to cases of serious misconduct. 
2.2.2 The  nature of employee  involvement 
The  regulations of all surveyed countries, with the exception of Italy,  include 
the right  to  information  and  consultation.  In Austria,  Denmark,  Finland  and 
Luxembourg,  this is a general and unspecified right, whereas in Belgium,  Greece, 
8  The following account relies heavily on European Industrial Relations 
Review,  vol.  183-184  1989. 
- 15  -Ireland,  the Netherlands,  Norway,  Spain,  Sweden  and  the  UK,  there is a  legal 
entitlement to certain specific types of information and consultation on certain 
issues as well.  Thus,  in Belgium,  which has the most specific framework,  health 
and safety committees have  a  statutory right to a  monthly report on health and 
safety  conditions,  information  on  potential  health  and  safety  risks,  and  a 
report on the activities of the firm's safety officer and occupational medicine 
service.  Furthermore,  the committees must be consulted on,  among  other,  things 
the purchase of protective equipment,  the formulation of the employer's annual 
health and safety action plan,  and  in general all health and safety policy. 
In  Finland,  Greece,  Ireland  and  Portugal,  representatives  are  not  legally 
entitled to carry out independent inspections of the workplace.  In most  other 
countries,  there are some  legal grounds,  although general and unspecific.  Only 
in  France  (four  times  a  year),  Luxembourg  (weekly)  and  the  UK  (every  three 
months)  is the right to inspection legally established in  details. 
In five of the surveyed countries- Denmark,  Finland,  Norway,  Spain and Sweden-
workers'  representatives  have  the  unequivocal  right  to  halt  the  work  of  an 
undertaking or parts of it on  the grounds  of danger to health and  safety.  In 
Belgium,  France,  West  Germany,  Italy, Portugal and the UK,  representatives have 
no  independent rights to stop work.  In Austria,  Ireland and Luxembourg,  repre-
sentatives can  invoke  the ministerial  Inspectorate of  Labour.  In the Nether-
lands,  individual  workers  can  halt  the  work.  In Greece,  representatives are 
entitled to demand  action from  employers. 
Only  in  Austria,  the  Netherlands,  and  Germany  do  health  and  safety 
representatives or workers'  representatives on works  councils have some  rights 
of co-decision on health and safety issues.  In Germany,  which has the most far-
reaching  regulation  in  this  respect,  works  councillors  must  be  informed  and 
consulted,  see all relevant  documents,  and  all decisions  must  be  endorsed  by 
them.  The  same  rules apply regarding the appointment of company  medical staff 
and  employee  safety representatives. 
2.2.3 Timing and duration of  employee participation 
Participation  on  the  issue  of  health  and  safety  takes  place  continuously. 
Participation occurs whenever  the health and safety committee or works  council 
gathers  and  discusses  health  and  safety  problems  and  whenever  the  workers' 
representatives  take time off  from  their regular work  to perform their duties 
as representatives. 
Furthermcre,  in  all  the  countries  surveyed,  workers'  representatives  are 
entitled  to  paid  time  off  to  carry  out  their  duties.  In  the  majority  of 
countries  the  amount  of  paid  time  off  is  not  specified  in  the  relevant 
legislation, but is covered by a  formula such as the time off "necessary for the 
proper  performance  of  their  duties"  (Germany).  In  Portugal,  Greece,  Italy, 
Spain,  Ireland,  and  France,  legislation specifies the amount  of  paid time  off 
for safety representatives,  ranging  from  40  hours per month  for  works  council 
representatives  in  Portugal  (though  health  and  safety  is  only  one  of  their 
responsibilities)  to a  maximum  of  2  hours every two  weeks  in Ireland. 
- 16  -2.3 Employee participation and  the question of new  technologies 
Employee  participation with respect  to the introduction of  new  technology has 
been  widely  discussed  since  the  second  half  of  the  1980s.  Increasing 
competition and diversification causes uncertainty which companies combat with 
technical  innovation and  structural reorganization.9  One  of  the  technologies 
concerned is information technology.  The  current wave  of  automation leads  to 
an  intrinsically  more  complex,  flexible  and  at  the  same  time  systematic 
production  process.  A  prominent  view  holds  that  the  potential  of  new 
technologies is only fully exploited if technical innovation is accompanied by 
a  reorganization of  the work  which allows greater worker  involvement. 
Correspondingly,  it is the basic argument of a  recent study that the nature of 
new  technology  increases  the potential  for  participation.  New  technologies, 
processes  of  work  reorganization  together  with  more  unpredictable  market 
conditions  increase  uncertainty.  Managers  hope  to  roope  with  the  increaser" 
uncertainty by  invoking the participation of workers.
1 
2.3.1  Regulatory  frameworks  and  the nature of  employee  involvement 
The  participative processes and structures in the field of new  technology show 
a  clear  tendency  towards  the  informal.  The  individual  nature  of  technical 
innovation and the premise that a production process should remain under control 
of  the producer make  governments  recognize that it is impossible to formulate 
concrete regulations.  Although  managers  may  consider workers'  cooperation as 
vital for  the success of  a  major  technology  investment,  they generally prefer 
direct,  informal  ways  of  participation and  oppose  regulation of  the  field  by 
legislation or collective agreements.  However,  during the 1980s Western Europe 
experienced  a  certain  diffusion  of  national  technology  agreements.  In  the 
following  paragraph,  some  important  national  technology  agreements  will  be 
outlined. 
France 
In 1988  a  number  of major employers and employee organizations concluded a  non-
binding  "orientation  agreement"  on  technological  change  and  company 
modernization.
11  However,  the  largest  union,  CGT,  refused  to  sign.  The 
general  objectives of  the  agreement  are to  stimulat~ collective bargaining on 
sectorial level  regarding the  issue of  technological  change,  and it generally 
emphasizes  and  encourages  the  establishment  of  joint  regulation  on  a 
decentralized level. 
In  relation  to  major  technology  plans,  the  document  motivates  both  sides  on 
industry  to  identify  at  sectorial  level  the  questions  and  procedures  for 
9 
10 
11 
M.  Piore and C.  Sabel, The  Second Industrial Divide,  Basic Books,  New 
York  1984. 
The  European  Foundation  for  the  Improvem~nt of  Living  and  Working 
Conditions,  New  Information Technology and Participation in Europe: 
The  potential for Social  Dialogue,  Dublin  1989. 
The  following account relies on European Industrial Relations Review, 
vols.  179  and  180,  1988. 
- 17  -information,  consultation  and  negotiation  which  should  be  implemented.  In 
relation to  incremental  innovations,  it is suggested that  'a report  on  tech-
nological  developments  and  technological  change  in the company  should be  sub-
mitted  at  regular  intervals  to  the  company  or  plant  works  council' ,  since 
incremental  innovations take place constantly. 
The  third and  last section of  the document  drafts general  guidelines  for  the 
sectorial negotiations.  It suggests three general topics,  to be borne in mind 
by  the negotiators: 
the specific role of management  staff during technical change; 
recognition of  new  qualifications  and  the coordination of  training pro-
grammes; 
organizational restructuring providing more opportunities for career deve-
lopment  and  promotion for employees. 
Sweden 
In  Sweden,  the  regulatory  framework  for  employee  participation  regarding 
introduction of  new  technology  is part of  broader  regulations  on  trade union 
participation and  co-decision,  primarily contained  in the Co-decision at Work 
Act  of  1976.12  One  of  the main  provisions of  the act requires  that before an 
employer decides on any important restructuring,  'he shall on his own  initiative 
negotiate with any  employees'  organization to which  he  is bound  by  collective 
agreement'.  This is not an isolated provision,  but forms  one part of a  network 
of negotiation duties. 
The  framework  provided  by  the  Co-decision  Act  in  1978  led  to  a  general 
collective agreement  on "joint regulation" for the public sector.  Among  other 
things,  this agreement states that "rationalization and planning of work"  is a 
matter for negotiation between employers and employee organizations,  just as it 
is explicitly stated that trade unions  make  the final decisions about  the way 
in which  information on rationalization plans is given. 
In  1982  negotiations  on  a  similar  agreement  covering  the  private sector were 
concluded with the signing of the "Agreement  on Efficiency and Participation". 
This  document  stipulates three  basic  areas  in which  local  bargaining parties 
should concentrate.  In  the section  'technical development',  it is stipulated 
that  the  unions  should  be  involved  at  the  earliest  possible  stage  of  the 
planning  of  a  technical  development  which  involves  important,  changes  for 
employees.  'The  employer  shall  explain  the  considerations  leading  to  the 
(planned  introduction  of)  new  technology  and  the  technical,  economic, 
environmental and employment consequences from  an overall point of view,  as well 
as any  proposal  which might exist to set up  project groups'. 
The  concrete  form  of  employee  involvement  has  to  be  agreed  at  local  level. 
Nevertheless,  the document indicates that 'it may  be agreed locally that matters 
of  a  limited  duration  (for  example  investment  in  building  and  machines, 
restructuring,  changes  in  work  organization)  should  be  dealt  with  and 
implemented  in a  project involving local employees'  organizations.' 
12  On  the  Swedish  co-determination  act,  see  e.g.  European  Industrial 
Relations Review,  vol.  31,  1976  and vol.  189,  1989. 
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new  work  tasks as early as possible and without loss of pay. 
Norway 
The Norwegian collective agreement of 1975 on the introduction of computer based 
systems  concluded  between  the  national  employers  organisation  NAF  and  the 
confederation of trade unions,  LO,  is an early example of regulation concerning 
information technology.  The  agreement was  initially signed for 3 years, but has 
been renewed several  times since. 
It states as  a  principle that in the design,  introduction and  use of  computer 
systems,  equal  importance  should  be  given  to  the  social  effects  as  to  the 
technical  and  economic  effects.  The  agreement  then  goes  on  to  lay  down 
procedures to be followed in the introduction of computerized systems,  primarily 
in so  far  as  the  local  union  is concerned.  It provides  for  the provision of 
information to  the  trade  unions  by  management  concerning  proposed  changes  as 
early as possible,  before decisions are made.  The  workforce is given the right 
to elect specialised representatives to deal with computer-related skills.  The 
unions are also given the right to negotiate  ~ocal agreements and to participate 
in project groups  when  systems are planned.
1 
When  the  agreement  was  renewed  in  1981  for  a  third  period,  the  terms  of 
reference were broadened to cover the introduction of new  technology in general. 
There was  also a  change in the terminology to emphasise negotiation at a  local 
level as a  means  of resolving conflict,  just as unions were  given the right to 
use external experts paid for by  the company  to advise them. 
Belgium 
In  1983  unions  and  private  sector  employers'  organizations  in  a  hard  fought 
compromise  reached  a  central  agreement,  'collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst  nr. 
39',  which  grants  employee  representatives  the  right  to  information  and 
consultation on  the  'social consequences'  of technical change.
14  The  agreement 
is only applicable where  the intended investment in new  technology is likely to 
have  'significant collective effects'  which  concern  50  percent or at least  10 
workers of  a  particular  'occupational category'. 
In  the  agreement  it is  stated  that  the  employer  must  provide  information  at 
least 3  months  before the introduction of  the new  technology.  The  information 
should describe the forthcoming technical change,  co:1tain a  description of the 
economic,  financial  or  technical  factors  that  motivate  its introduction,  and 
predict the nature of its social consequences.  The  information has to be prov-
ided to the works  council or the union representatives.  After information has 
been  provided,  the  employer  must  consult  the  employee  representative  on  the 
13 
14 
The  European Foundation,  Negotiating technical change,  Dublin 1982, 
p.  67. 
The  following  account  is  based  on  European  Industrial  Relations 
Review vol.  121,  1984,  A.  Clauwaert et al. Overleg in de onderneming 
by  invoering van nieuwe  technologieen:  de rol van  CAO  39,  Stichting 
Technologie  Vlaanderen,  Brussel,  1987  and  M.  Albertijn  et  al., 
Informatie  en  overleg  bij  technologie  introducties,  Stichting 
Technologie Vlaanderen,  Brussel  1987. 
- 19  -social consequences:  the foreseeable changes  in workforce size and structure, 
working  conditions,  employee  health  and  safety  and  the possible  need  for  new 
skills.  The  financial,  economical  and  technical  aspects  are  not  matter  for 
consultation. 
If the employer does not comply  with these prov1s1ons,  he/she will be required 
to  pay  every  ex-worker,  whose  dismissal  is  directly  attributable  to  the 
introduction of  new  technology,  a  compensation  equal  to  3  months'  wages.  No 
sanctions are provided when  the introduction of new  technologies does not lead 
to lay-offs. 
A number  of empirical investigations indicates that the agreement is respected 
only rarely.
15  One  empirical  survey in  1986  concluded that in only  one  third 
of  the cases where  the agreement  is applicable,  had  information been provided 
3 months before implementation.  Furthermore,  in only 27  percent of these cases 
had  the agreement  constituted the basis  for  the procedure.  However,  the rare 
application does not mean  that no  information has been provided.  Mainly,  other 
agreements.  or informal channels have  been used. 
Germany 
In West  Germany,  a  number of legal provisions and collective agreements regulate 
employee  participation in the field of  technical  change.  In general,  the co-
decision  laws  - outlined  in  section  2. 3  of  the  paper  - attribute  to  works 
councils the right to information and consultation with respect to the technical 
equipment  of  the workplace. 
Furthermore,  on  the basis  of  the co-decision  regulation,  a  series of  company 
level  technology  agreements  have  been  reached.  These  agreements  are  very 
specific  and  involve  concrete  technologies.  For  instance  at  Volkswagen,  a 
company  agreement  was  installed  in  1986,  regulating  the  establishment  and 
operation of  "VW  circles".  They  provide for the setting up of voluntary groups 
of  employees  at all  levels  and  in all  areas  of  the  company's  operations  to 
discuss ways  of  improving the quality of work  and  the working environment,  job 
satisfaction and  the  use  of  employees'  talents  and  expertise.
16  The  text  of 
agreement states explicitly that the employees  of  any  plant should be able to 
participate in the planning of work  and  technology. 
In  1987,  a  new  technology  agreement  was  concluded at Volkswagen,  covering not 
only  major  investments  in  new  technology  but  also  the  impact  of  incremental 
changes in existing techniques.
17  The  agreement excludes every possibility of 
dismissal  due  to technical  change,  provides  works  councils  with  the right to 
full  information and consultation,  and  allows  the  works  council's  involvement 
in the planning and training necessary for employees. 
15 
1' 
17 
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As  appears  from  the  preceding  texts  the  regulation  on  employee  participation 
with respect to new  technology rarely stipulates the precise timing and duration 
of  involvement.  The  exception is Belgium,  where  a  collective agreement states 
that information must  be provided at least 3  months  before the introduction of 
new  technology.  Furthermore,  the  Swedish  requirement  that  employers  on  their 
own  initiative must make  contact with the local employee organization regarding 
any  major  restructuring  of  the  workplace,  may  mean  a  relatively  early 
involvement of employees. 
In general,  the regulation on employee participation in the field of technology 
as exemplified by  the cases in the preceding sections,  takes the form  of  loose 
and  often non-binding  framework  agreements  and  recommendations.  The  notable 
exception from this pattern is the Belgian law which,  to a  considerable degree, 
however,  appears  to be  ignored by  employers  and  employees at local level. 
These  points  illustrate  that  the  question  of  new  technologies  hardly  lends 
itself readily to any detailed regulation on employee participation at national 
level,  as conditions and circumstances vary considerably from  local setting to 
local setting. 
2  4  F.  .  1  t•  .  t•  18  •  1nanc1a  par 1c1pa 1on 
The  question of financial participation involves all political aspects related 
to the question of employee participation in general:  firstly,  some  economists, 
as well as certain political circles,  view financial participation as a  way  of 
overcoming  economic  crisis situations  such as  "stagflation".
19  This  argument 
has,  however,  been  contested  by  other  economists,  who  emphasize  the  inherent 
instability of  the  "share economy"  (i.e.  an  economy  where  payment  of  wages  is 
replaced by  profit-sharing or employee  share-ownership).20  Secondly,  a  common 
management  position views certain forms  of  financial  employee  participation -
such  as  profit  sharing  - as  a  means  to  increasing  company  efficiency  and 
flexibility,  but rejects other forms  as politically unacceptable. 
Finally,  trade  unions  and  the  labour  movement  in general  view  other  forms  of 
financial  participation,  primarily  employee  investment  funds,  as  a  means  to 
extend worker control over their workplace as well as to obtain a  reduction in 
the concentration of power  and wealth.  Other forms  of financial participation 
are often rejected as  attempts  at breaking  up  worker  solidarity  and  reducing 
equality amongst  the employees. 
18 
19 
20 
Annex  I  contains  a  comparative  tabl~ summar1s1ng  the  main  results 
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The  term  "financial participation" is a  diffuse one.  Indeed,  with respect  to 
a  number  of  what  is normally  termed  "financial  participative  schemes",  it is 
questionable  whether  there  is  actually  an  element  of  employee  participation 
going  beyond  the  possibility  of  an  increase  in  the  employees'  psychological 
involvement in his or her workplace. 
This is certainly the case for schemes  such as performance bonuses and payment 
by  results.  Profit-sharing schemes  are relatively common  in Western Europe  -
for  instance  France  and  the  United  Kingdom  provide  legislation which  ensures 
obligatory profit  sharing  for  companies  above  a  certain  size  and  encourages 
profit sharing  through  tax  concessions,  respectively  - but  schemes  like this 
only entail  employee  participation in a  very  limited sense of  the  term.  The 
same  applies  to profit-related employee  bonuses  transferred to social  savings 
accoimts,  as is common  in  Germany  and  to  some  extent  also  in  France  and  the 
United Kingdom. 
Financial participation through employee share ownership may  take several forms. 
The  most  straightforward is the  individual  procurement  of  shares.  Sometimes, 
shares are bought collectively through saving funds  to which both the employer 
and the employee contribute.  In the United Kingdom  the scheme of the "Employee 
Share  Ownership  Plan"  (ESOP)  has attracted a  great deal  of  attention since it 
appeared in 1978.  An ESOP  is a  share participation scheme linked to an employee 
benefit trust.  The  trust acquires shares  in the  company  and distributes them 
among  the  employees  through  a  share  scheme.  The  initial equity  stake  in the 
company  is usually financed by a  loan,  which is paid back through contributions 
from the company.  A key difference between ESOPs  and other schemes is that they 
allow  a  more  significant  employee  share participation.  As  such,  unions  have 
become  very  involved with the  implementation.
21 
Again  the  question  remains  to  what  extent  this  system  of  employee  share 
ownership  actually contributes  to  workers'  participation.  The  proportion of 
shares reserved for employees normally remains very small.  For instance, in the 
UK  it is estimated that the total equity in a  company  hel~ by  employees reaches 
10%  in only  6%  of the large firms  and  1%  of small  firms.  2  Moreover,  employee 
shares are usually non-voting shares. 
Employee  investment  funds 
Employee  investment  funds  are normally  financed  from  company  profits beyond  a 
certain level.  Employee  investment  funds  are not controlled by  the employer, 
but are established on a  regional or national level and are controlled by  trade 
unions. 
The  only  country  where  employee  investment  funds  are  fully  established  is 
Sweden.  Here,  the question of employee investment funds was  first raised by the 
Swedish trade union confederation,  LO,  at its congress in 1971.  The  principal 
motivation for initiating investigations on  the subject was  the perceived need 
to redistribute "excess profits" of efficient companies,  seen to arise from  LO's 
21  European  Industrial Relations Review,  vol.  181,  1989. 
22  European  Industrial Relations Review,  vol.  181,  1989. 
- 22  -"solidarity" wage  policy, which levelled out pay between high and low wage  areas 
of the economy. 
Between  1971  and  1983,  LO  and  the closely affiliated Swedish social democratic 
party,  SAP,  debated  a  series  of  measures,  primarily  aimed  at  profit 
redistribution.  However,  the  employee  investment  fund  scheme  adopted  in 1983 
was  designed to achieve five stated objectives:23 
a  strengthening of the State pension system, 
a  reduction in the concentration of power  and  wealth, 
an increase in the capital available for  investment  in industry, 
a  strengthening of the 'solidarity' wage  policy through the moderation of 
wage  demands, 
an  increase of worker control. 
To  this end  five  funds  were  set up  on  a  regional basis.  The  funds  were  to be 
managed  by  boards comprising nine government  appointees,  of  whom  at least five 
were representative of the interests of employees.  The  income of the funds was 
to be derived from  two  sources:  an increase in the employers'  contributions to 
the  state  pensions  system  and  from  a  new  "profit  sharing"  tax  on  large  and 
profitable  companies.  However,  this  funding  was  restricted  to  7  years:  the 
period  1984-1990.  Furthermore,  individual  funds  were  not  allowed  to  acquire 
more  than 8%  of the voting shares in a  listed company,  and all in all therefore 
the five  funds  could not own  more  that  40%  of any  listed company. 
The  employee  investment  funds  scheme  has  been severely  opposed,  especially by 
employers but also by local unions.  The employers' organizations considered the 
funds as a  means  to convert the market economy  into a socialist planned economy. 
They  went  so far as to organize large demonstrations. 
Five  years  after  installation of  the  funds,  an  evaluation  revealed  that  the 
funds had done little to prevent further concentration of ownership,  just as the 
effects of the funds on  investment in industry and on wage  demands are difficult 
to  discern.24  On  the  issue  of  worker  control,  opponents  of  the  funds  argue 
that  since  they  are controlled by  central  union officials and  not  by  workers 
they  have  lead  to  a  certain collectivisation  of  ownership  rather  than  wider 
share ownership.  Defenders of the funds  argue that although shareholding of a 
fund  in any single company  rarely exceeds more  that  1%,  it gives employees  the 
possibility to attend company  general meetings and to collect information.  The 
LO  has,  however,  conceded that "it is hardly at general meetings that influence 
in the company  is primarily exercised": 
In other western European states,  as  in Denmark  and  the Netherlands,  employee 
investment funds have been discussed as well.  In the Netherlands,  the coalition 
government in 1976 attempted to create a national fund equivalent to the Swedish 
employee  investment  funds.  The  fund  would  be  financed  from  company  profits 
beyond  a  certain  level  and  would  aim  at  providing  individual  workers  with 
financial benefits and at improving existing pen~ion arrangements.  However,  in 
light of  the severe opposition to the proposal,  it was  withdrawn. 
23  European  Industrial Relations Review,  vol.  179,  1988. 
24  European  Industrial Relations Review,  vol.  179,  1988,  p.15. 
- 23  -- 24  -PART  THREE;  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY  AND  EMPLOYEE  PARTICIPATION 
3.1  General  European  Community  frameworks  for  employee  participation25 
The  various studies carried out and proposals submitted by  the Commission of the 
European  Communities  on  the subject of  employee  participation are evidence of 
a  continuing  interest in the question of  employee  participation,  just as  the 
fate of many  of these proposals reveal the delicacy of the subject area.  Thus, 
for over two decades,  the question of employee participation has been one of the 
most controversial issues in European Community social policy.  Discussions have 
been protracted and opposition to a  number of Commission proposals in this area 
has been fierce. 
As  a  consequence,  most  Community  initiatives  on  employee  participation  at 
present  remain at the preparatory stage.  However,  some  E.C.  legislation does 
exist and will be described briefly in the  following paragraphs.  After this, 
the paper outlines a  number  of  proposals  for  more  comprehensive  frameworks  on 
employee  participation,  ranging  from  the original  1970  proposal  on  a  European 
company  statute to the Commission's  1991  proposal  on  a  European  works  council 
in community  scale undertakings. 
3.1.1  Existing E.C.  regulation for general  employee  participation 
The  Community  has adopted three directives which,  in relation to the protection 
of  employees  in the event  of  changes  in the structure of  undertakings,  entail 
some  degree of employee participation.  Furthermore,  the Community  has adopted 
regulation  on  the  European  Economic  Interest  Grouping  which  also  ensures  a 
certain element of employee  involvement. 
The  Council directive of  17  February  1975  on  the approximation of  the  laws of 
the Member  States relating to collective dismissal  ,  states that consultation 
of  employees  before collective dismissals is obligatory and  must  be conducted 
before redundancies are made.
26  "Collective redundancy"  is in turn defined as 
dismissals effected by  an employer  for  one or more  reasons  not related to the 
individual  workers  concerned  where,  according  to  the  choice  of  the  Member 
States,  the  number  of  such dismissals  exceeds  a  given proportion of  the  work 
force determined by  the size of the undertaking. 
Furthermore,  the directive states that consultation of  employees  must  involve 
supplying workers  with all relevant  information and  must  be aimed  at reaching 
an agreement.  The directive also contains an obligation for employers to notify 
in writing public authorities prior to collective dismissals.  A copy  of  this 
notification  must  be  forwarded  to  the  workers'  representatives.  The  public 
authority then has  30  days to seek solutions, after which the redundancies take 
effect. 
25 
26 
Annex  II contains a  table published in European Industrial Relations 
Review,  August  1991,  on  E.C.  proposals  and  measures  on  employee 
participation. 
Directive 75/129/EEC,  OJ  No.  L  48  of  22.2.1975. 
- 25  -In November  1991  the Commission  adopted  a  proposal  for  a  directive27  amending 
Directive  75/129/EEC.  The  main  purpose  is  to  ensure  that  information  and 
consultation procedures also apply to employing undertakings issuing collective 
redundancies  as  a  result  of  proposals  of  decisions  taken  by  the  controlling 
undertaking  or  by  the  central  administration  of  a  multi-establishment 
undertaking. 
The  Council  Directive of  14  February  1977  on  the approximation of  the  laws  of 
the Member  States relating to the safeguarding of employees' right/ in the event 
of transfers of undertakings,  businesses or parts of businesses,2  particularly 
in connection with  mergers  and  takeovers  stipulates,  among  other  things,  the 
automatic transfer of  rights and obligations arising from  employees'  terms of 
employment  to the  new  employer.  Furthermore,  the directive provides  for  the 
protection  of  employee  representatives  in  the  event  of  transfer  of  the 
undertaking,  just as it is stated that the transferrer and the transferee must 
inform  the  employees'  representatives  of  the  reasons  for  the  transfer,  its 
legal,  social and  economic  implications,  as well  as any  measures  envisaged in 
relation to the employees. 
The  Council  Directive of  9  October  1978  concerning  mer~ers of  public  limited 
liability  companies  within  any  single  Member  State 9  (internal  mergers) 
contains similar provisions  for  the consultation and  information of  employees 
as in the previously mentioned directive. 
The  Council Regulation on  the European Economic  Interest Grouping  (EEIG)  seeks 
to facilitate cooperation between undertakings of different member  states.  An 
EEIG  aims at improving its members'  economic performances, but not at generating 
profit  for  itself.
30  Thus,  an  EEIG  is not  a  European  Company,  but  rather  an 
institution  established in order to  improve  cooperation between companies  of 
different Member  States.  The  initial proposal  on  a  legal  framework  for  EEIGs 
dates  back  to  1974.
31  ~~  was  amended  in  April  1978,  and  the  regulation  was 
adopted on  25  July  1985. 
Following comments  made  at the  time by  the European  Parliament,  provisions to 
provide more effective protection of employees' interests were inserted (Article 
1a).  33  Workers  must  be  informed  before  a  group  is  created,  and  if their 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
COM(91)  292. 
Directive No.  77/187/EEC,  OJ  No.  L 61  of 5.3.1977 (entered into force 
in March  1979). 
Directive no.  78/855/EEC,  OJ  No.  L 295  of  20.10.1978  (entered  into 
force  October  1981). 
Article 3(1)  of EEC  Regulation No.  2137/85 adopted by  the Council on 
25  July  1985. 
EC  Bulletin,  supplement No.  1/74. 
OJ  No.  L  199  of  31.7.1985. 
A2-211/88 of 6 October 1988  on  the role of the social partners in the 
Community,  see  also  Written  Question  by  Mr  Baudis  No.  2561/87  -
OJ  No.  C 303/88,  p.  45. 
- 26  -interests are damaged  by  the creation of such a  group,  the persons wishing to 
set  up  an  EEIG  must  agree  with  the  employees  on  measures  to  be  taken.  The 
provisions of the Member  State in question on the protection of employees shall 
apply if no  such agreement is reached. 
In  the  opinion of  the  European  Trade  Union  Confederation,  ETUC,  the  EEIG  is 
designed to enable undertakings to combine at the European level without forming 
a  European company  and being without subject to its more  stringent requirements 
on,  among  other things,  employee participation.  It is therefore a  flexibl1 but 
also very lax instrument which  is not  seen to meet  the  ETUC  requirements. 
4 
3.1.2 The  proposal for a  directive on  the structure of public limited liability 
companies  (Draft Fifth Directive) 
The  proposals  on  a  directive  on  the  structure  of  public  limited  liability 
companies is based on article 54,  3  (g)  of the EEC  Treaty,  which sets up the aim 
of  harmonizing  the conditions  for establishing companies  in the Member  States 
in order to facilitate competition on  equal  footing. 
The  first  proposal,  put  forward  in  1972,
35  suggested  a  company  structure 
similar to the German  two-tier model,  i.e. with both a  supervisory board and a 
management  board.  With  respect to employee participation,  the document  simply 
stated that  "not  less  than  one-third of  the  members  of  the  supervisory board 
shall be appointed by  the workers  or their representatives". 
Following considerable opposition to the original proposal,  particularly  from 
France and  the United Kingdom,  but also from  the centre-right majority of  the 
Europ!an  Parliament, 
36  the  second  proposal,  advanced  by  the  Commission  in 
1983, 
7  has  been substantially amended.  Notably,  companies  are now  given  the 
possibility  to  choose  between  a  unitary  and  a  two-tier structure.  Regarding 
employee  participation,  this proposal  allows  the  Member  States'the choice  of 
four different models. 
The  first  model  is  board-level  representation  on  supervisory  boards,  where 
employee representatives are appointed by  the employees  and constitute between 
one-third and one-half of board members.  In the second model,  employee board-
level representation takes place through co-opting procedures.  No  rules as to 
the employee share of total board membership are specified.  In the third model 
employee  participation takes  the  form  of bodies  equivalent  to works  councils, 
i.e. bodies external to company  boards.  These bodies have the right to regular 
information  and  consultation  "on  the  administration,  situation,  progress  and 
prospects  of  the  company".  Finally,  the  fourth  model  allows  "participation 
through collectively agreed procedures analogous  to one of the three preceding 
models". 
34 
35 
36 
37 
European Trade Union Institute, Info 26,  "The social dimension of the 
internal market",  p.  35. 
OJ  No.  C 131  of  13.12.1972. 
See  Jacques  Vandamme,  "Informing  and  Consulting  Employees  in 
Multinational  Undertakings",  PUF  1984. 
OJ  No.  C 240  of 9.9.1983. 
- 27  -As it appears,  the amended proposal represents a significant modification of the 
regulative framework  on employee participation contained in the original text. 
Accordingly,  the ETUC  expressed disappointment with the amendments,  just as it 
was  regretted that none of the four participation models allowed for equivalent 
worker participation.  The  "Union des Industries de la Communaute  Europeenne", 
UNICE,  remained opposed to the directive. 
38  On  10  July  1991  the  European  Parliament  reported  on  the  second  amended 
proposal  for  a  Fifth  Council  Directive
39  designed  to  limit  the  issue  of 
preference shares, not carrying voting rights, to 50%  of the subscribed capital. 
The  Commission  proposal  did  no't  aim  to change  the  proposed  models  as  regards 
employee participation.  However,  Parliament added an amendment stating that the 
company  should  inform the employee's  representation of  a  takeover bid for  the 
company.  The  representative of the Commission did not find that this belonged 
to  the  proposal  and  said  also  that  the  issue  of  worker  participation still 
remained a  stumbling block with the Fifth Directive. 
3. 1 . 3  The  "Vredelinq"  proposal  on  procedures  for  informing  and  consulting 
employees  of undertakings with complex  structure 
The  proposal  of  the  "Vredeling" directive  ("Vredeling"  after the  former  Dutch 
Commissioner)  aims at providing informing and consulting procedures consistent 
with  the  complex  structure  of  certain  categories  of  companies,  namely  -
according to the 1983  proposal - on the one hand subsidiaries in the Community, 
when  a  total of  at least  1000  workers  is employed  in the  Community  by  parent 
undertaking  and  its  subsidiaries  taken  as  a  whole,  and  on  the  other  hand 
undertakings having in the Community  one or more  establishments with a  total of 
at  least  1000  employees.  The  first  proposal  was  put  forward  in  1980.
40 
An 
amended  version was  presented by  the Commission  in 1983.
41 
The  legal basis for the proposed directive is article 100  of the EEC  Treaty on 
the approximation of such national laws and regulations,  which directly affects 
the  establishment  and  functioning  of  the  common  market.  However,  in  the 
preamble to the proposal,  the Commission also emphasizes the social motivations 
underlying it. 
According  to the Vredeling directive,  employee  representatives have  the right 
to a  broad range of information.  Thus,  it is stated that at least once a  year, 
at a  fixed date,  the management  of the parent company  shall give the workers  a 
clear picture of the company's activities as well as those of its subsidiaries. 
It shall forward specific company  information in relation to 
38 
39 
40 
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- the structure of  the company, 
the  economic  and  financial situation, 
- the probable development  of  the business and of production and 
sales, 
OJ  C 240/91,  p.  104. 
COM(90)  629. 
OJ  No.  c  297  of  1  5 . 11 . 1980. 
OJ  No.  c  217  of  12.8.1983. 
- 28  -- the employment  situation and probable trends,  and 
- investment prospects. 
If the information required here is not provided within 30  days after the fixed 
date,  employees of subsidiaries are entitled to approach the management  of the 
parent company. 
Furthermore,  where  the  management  of  a  parent  undertaking  proposes  to  take  a 
decision which will have a substantial effect on the interests of its employees, 
it is required to forward precise information in good time.  Specifically, this 
means  information on 
- the grounds  for the proposed decision, 
- the legal,  economic,  and social consequences of  the decision 
for  employees,  and 
- the measures  planned in respect of employees. 
The management of subsidiaries affected by such decisions shall communicate this 
information  to  employees'  representatives,  ask  for  their  opinion,  and  hold 
consultations with them with a  view to attempting to reach an agreement.  Where 
these requirements are not met,  Member  States shall ensure that employees have 
the  right  to  appeal  to  a  tribunal  or  other  competent  national  authority  for 
measures  to be  taken to compel  the management  of  the subsidiary to fulfil its 
obligations. 
In general,  however,  article 7 of the proposal states that the management  of an 
undertaking  is  not  obliged  to  communicate  secret  information,  defined  as 
information which,  if disclosed,  could substantially damage  the undertaking's 
interests or lead to the failure of its plans. 
The  political fate of  the  "vredeling" proposal 
Since its advancement,  the Vredeling proposal has encountered stiff opposition. 
Some  Member  States,  notably  the  United  Kingdom  and  Denmark,  opposed  the 
directive, since the practice of these countries leaves rules concerning methods 
of informing and consulting of employees entirely to management  and unions and 
to collective bargaining.  The  Confederation of British Industry,  CBI,  saw  the 
proposal as essentially forcing companies to disclose information and forecasts 
in a  way  which would frequently  prejudice commercial confidentiality and impede 
the decision making  process. 
Similarly,  the  UNICE  rejected  the  proposal  as  inflexible  and  as  "at  worst 
inimical  and  at  best  irrelevant  to  the  major  problems  facing  the  Community, 
primarily as company  decision making  would  be s19wed down,  and as confidential 
information would  not be adequately protected."4 
The  ETUC  gave a  more  favourable reception to the Community  initiative,  regardin~ 
it as a  feasible compromise  between worker  and  ~mployee interests in the EC.
4 
It bases its position on  the principle that an EC  Directive must  not introduce 
any deterioration into the legislative situation in the Member  States in which 
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UNICE  position paper on  the "Vredeling"-directive,  28.9.1983. 
"The amended Vredeling-proposal",  Survey drawn up by J.M.  Didier and 
associates,  European  News  Agency,  1983,  p.  6. 
- 29  -there is a  high level of worker's rights and that it should bring improvements 
for  countries  where  the  level  is  lower.  However,  the  ETUC  identifies  three 
points  which  need  to  be  improved:  management  must  not  be  given  the exclusive 
authority to refuse  information on  the grounds  of confidentiality,  employees' 
representatives  should  be  able  to  approach  the  parent  company  directly,  and 
information obligations must  include investment and production plans as well as 
introduction of new  technology. 
In the end,  the Vredeling proposal did not survive the controversies surrounding 
it from  the very outset.  In July  1986,  the Council  formally  realized that it 
could  not  reach  an  agreement  on  the directive.  Consequently,  it decided  to 
postpone further initiatives and action in the area until at least  1989.
44 
3 . 1 . 4 The proposal on the European Works  Council in Community-scale undertakings 
In January  1991  the Commission  forwarded  a  proposal  for a  Council Directive on 
the establishment and functioning of a European Works  Council in Community-scale 
undertakings.
45 
The  proposal  may  be  seen  as  a  partial  revival  of  the  Vredeling  proposal, 
although  the  aim  is considerably  more  modest:  whereas  the  Vredeling  proposal 
aimed  at  providing  consultation and  information  procedures  in companies  with 
more  than  1000  employees,  the  proposal  on  European  Works  Councils  (EWCs)  is 
restricted  to  enterprises  with  at  least  1000  employees  within  the  Community 
having establishments or undertakings  with at least  100  employees  in at least 
two  Member  States.  Thus,  the stated objective of  the proposal is "to overcome 
the  territorial  limitations  of  national  laws  on  information  and  consultation 
procedures". 
To  this  end,  a  general  legal  framework  for  negotiations  is suggested:  at the 
request of central management or employees,  a negotiating body shall be created, 
including at least one employee  representative from  each Member  State in which 
the Community-scale undertaking employs at least 100  workers.  This negotiating 
body  shall aim  at reaching an  agreement  on,  among  other  things,  the nature of 
the EWC,  the number of members,  its functions and powers,  and the procedures for 
informing and consulting the EWC. 
If an agreement cannot be reached,  the proposal stipulates a  number  of  m1n1mum 
requirements  applying  to  the  central  management  of  the  Community-scale 
undertaking.  Thus,  it is stated that the  EWC,  which  is to have  between  3  and 
30  members  and  to  include at least one  member  from  each Member  State in which 
the  Community-scale  undertaking  employs  at  least  100  persons,  shall  have  the 
right to meet  with central management  at least once  a  year  and  to be  informed 
and consulted by  the central management  on  any  management  proposals  likely to 
have consequences  for  the employees. 
44  OJ  No.  C 203  of  21.7.1986. 
45  COM(90)  581  final. 
- 30  -On  the  10  July  1991
46  the  European  Parliament  approved  the  proposal  with 
considerable  amendment.  Thus  voted  Parliament  to  amend  the  legislation  by 
applying  the  rules  to  companies  employing  at  least  500  employees  instead  of 
1,000.  Parliament also proposed to change the legal basis.  The  Commission  had 
used article  100  (unanimity  vote),  Parliament  proposed article  118A  as  legal 
basis,  that is majority vote in the Council and two  readings in the Parliament. 
In September  1991  the Commission presented an amended proposal.47  Although the 
Commission  took account of  some  of Parliament's amendments,  it did not  change 
neither the legal basis nor the number  of employees. 
3.1.5 Employee  participation in the European  Company  Statute proposal 
In  recent  years,  especially  in  the  light  of  the  process  towards  the  single 
European  market,  high  priority has  been  given  to  the  creation  of  a  European 
company  statute,  which  would  pr~vide  a  legal  basis  for  business  companies 
independent  of national  systems.4  The  question of  employee  participation in 
the European  company  has,  however,  been  one  of  the main  obstacles to reaching 
an  agreement:  Member  States  with  a  tradition for  regulation  on  participation 
will not accept a statute which does not contain equivalent regulation,  as this, 
in  reality,  would  undermine  national  regulation.  Other  Member  States  are 
critical of employee participation measures  in general. 
The  Commission's  initial proposal  on  a  European  Company  Statute dates back to 
30  June  1970.
49  It  was  amended  for  the  first  time  on  13  May  1975.
50  The 
Statute  for  a  European  public  limited  liability company  in  the  amended  1975 
version proposed a  choice  of  three models  of  employee participation depending 
on  the structure of  the company  in question: 
a  European  Works  Council,  if  the  company  has  at  least  two 
establishments in different Member  States; 
a  Group Works  Council if the company  comprises several undertakings; 
employee representation on  the Supervisory Board. 
This proposal was  deadlocked in the Council.  However,  in June 1987  the European 
Council  renewed its call for  the European  institutions to make  rapid progress 
with regard to reforming company  law  to pave  the way  for  the establishment of 
a  European  Company  Statute. 
The  Commission,  in a  memorandum  on  the European  Comf,any  Statute,  continued to 
regard  employee  participation  as  a  key  component. 
1  It  concluded  that  the 
system of employee participation should be based on  the principles guiding the 
most  advanced employee participation systems  in force  in Community  countries, 
46  OJ  C 240/91,  p.  118 
47  COM(91)  345  final. 
48  EC  Bulletin,  supplement No.  3/88 p.  8. 
49  EC  Bulletin,  supplement No.  8/1970. 
50  EC  Bulletin,  supplement No.  4/1975. 
51  COM(88)  320  final. 
- 31  -while being sufficiently flexible to enable agreement to be reached between the 
management  and labour.  The  memorandum  suggested a  choice between three models 
of participation. 
In the first model,  employees  elect not  less than one  third and not more  than 
half of  the members  of the supervisory board. 
In  the  second  model,  employees  participate  through  a  body  representing  the 
employees,  quite separate  from  the company  organs.  This  body  must,  at least 
every third month,  be informed by the supervisory or the management board on the 
company,  its subsidiaries and the expected development,  and has the right to be 
consulted and to request specific information. 
Following the third model,  employees participate through collectively negotiated 
systems,  to be agreed upon within the company.  This agreement must ensure that 
employees  or  their  representatives  have  the  right  to  information  on  the 
company's  situation  and  prospects  every  third  month  and  to  information  and 
consultation on  important decisions. 
In a  resolution of 2 December  1988,  the ETUC,  with a  few  reservations1  welcomed 
the  Commission's  initiative  to  revive  the  European  company. 5  UNICE, 
meanwhile,  in its opinion  of  7  November  1988,  pointed  to  the  example  of  the 
United States to endorse its argument that a  statute for a  European company  was 
not essential for the completion of the internal market.  UNICE  seems to support 
a  variety  of  different  methods  of  trans-frontier  cooperation  setween 
undertakings with a  view to enhancing their mutual  economic  interests.
5 
On  16  March  1989  the  European  Parliament  adopted  a  Resolution  on  the 
Commission's  memorandum. 
54  It  called  for  several  equally  valid  models  for 
participation to  be  included  in the  Statute,  with  the  social  dimension  being 
regarded as an essential and  indispensable component  of  the internal market. 
After releasing its memorandum  in July  1988,  the  Commission  submitted  formal 
proposals on the European Company  Statute one  ~ear later.  The Statute in itself 
takes the  form  of  a  draft Council Regulation, 
5  whereas  employee participation 
is to be dealt with separately in a  Council draft Directive,  thus giving Member 
States more  legislative leeway. 
Article 3 of the proposed directive on the position of employees in the European 
Company  lays down  rules for the choice of various models  of participation which 
the  Commission  had  proposed  in  its  memorandum.  Article  4  covers  employee 
participation,  either via board-level  representation on  the supervisory board 
(two-tier company  structure), or on an administrative board in which management 
and  regulatory  functions  are clearly determined  (one tier company  structure). 
Article 5 covers participation via a  separate body equivalent to works councils. 
52 
53 
54 
55 
European Institute of Unions,  Info 26:  the social dimension of  the 
internal market,  Part 2,  p.  55. 
A2-405/88. 
OJ  No.  C 96  of  17.4.1989. 
COM(89)  268  final. 
- 32  -,, 
' 
Finally,  Article  6  allows  for  other  models  to  be  established  in  European 
companies  by  means  of a  negotiated collective agreement. 
The  proposal  was  submitted  to  the  Council,  Parliament  and  the  Economic  and 
Social Committee in August  1989.  In the European Parliament's first reading on 
24  January  1991  and  in its amendments  put  forward here,  the central point for 
majority  of  the  parliamentarians  was  that  the  three  different  partjcipative 
models  should  involve equivalent degrees  of  employee  participation.
5  In May 
1991  the  Commission  presented  an  amended  proposal  for  a  directive57  in which 
it  followed  Parliament's  wishes  as  regards  equivalence  between  the  various 
models. 
3.1.6 E.C.  initiatives with  respect  to  employee  participation in profits  and 
enterprise results 
In July 1991  the Commission adopted a Council Recommendati~n concerning employee 
participation  in  profits  and  enterprise  results. 
5  In  this  draft 
Recommendation  the actions at Community  level mainly consist of 
encouraging  the  use  of  financial  participation  schemes  and  the 
exchange between users of experiences with these schemes; 
the  supply  of  relevant  information  about  financial  participation 
schemes; 
encouraging  the  creation  of  some  types  of  financial  participation 
schemes  to be used community-wide  under  comparable conditions; 
monitoring further developments  in this field. 
This draft is under discussion in the Committee  on  Social Affairs,  Employment 
and Working  Environment  of the European Parliament. 
3.2 The  EC  and employee  participation on  health and  safety at work 
The  deadlocked  1983  vredeling proposal contained a  paragraph,  which stipulated 
the employees'  right to consul§ation on  proposed measures relating to workers' 
health and  industrial safety.
5 
· 
However,  in March  1988  the Commission,  on the basis of article 118a of the EEC 
Treaty  as  amended  by  the  Single  European  Act,  pu~  forward  a  proposal  for  a 
framework  directive  on  health  and  safety at work. 
0  The  European  Parliament 
put  forward  a  number  of  proposals  for  amendments  in its readings  in  1988  and 
1989,  in general  aiming at  improving  provisions  for  employee  participation, 
_., 
' 
56  OJ  C 48/91,  p.  72. 
57  COM(91)  174  - SYN  219. 
58  COM(91)  259 
59  Article 4,  2  (e)  in the  1983  proposal. 
60  COM(88)  73  final,  OJ  No.  C 141  of 30.5.1988. 
- 33  -consultation and  "battanced participation".  In June  1989,  the Council  adopted 
the final directive. 
1 
With  respect  to employee  participation,  the  framework  directive stipulates  a 
number of minimum  requirements on information and consultation of employees,  on 
risks  to  health  and  safety  at  work  as  well  as  measures  taken  against  these 
risks.  Thus,  employers  are  required  to  appoint  employee  health  and  safety 
representatives  who  in  turn  must  have  the  necessary  training  to  assist  in 
preventing or  reducing  threats  to health and  safety.  The  appointed  employee 
health  and  safety  representatives  are  entitled to  the  time  off  necessary  to 
carry out their duties without· any  loss of pay,  just as  they are,  among  other 
things,  given the right to be present when  the competent national authorities 
carry out inspections of the workplace. 
The  directive  also  states  that  employees  in general  are  to  be  informed  with 
respect to  'the safety and health risks and protective and preventive measures 
and activities in respect of  both the undertaking in general  and  each  type of 
workstation and/or  job'.  The  employer's duty to inform and consult employees 
included,  inter alia, 
any  action,  which  may  have  significant consequences  for  health and 
safety at work, 
the appointment  of  employee health and  safety representatives,  and 
the employer's evaluation of risks to health and  safety at work. 
3.3  EC  initiatives with respect to employee  participation on  new  technologies 
The  Community  has  not  attempted  to  create  any  comprehensive  legislative 
framework  when  it  comes  to  employee  participation  on  introduction  of  new 
technologies.  However,  the  1983  Vredeling  proposal  did  contain  a  paragraph 
which  required employers  in companies  with more  than  1000  employees  to inform 
and consult employees'  representatives on proposed decisions  concern~ng "major 
modifications resulting from  the introduction of new  technologies".6 
In recent years,  the focus of Community activities in this field has been on the 
dialogue between  the management  and  labour organized in ETUC,  UNICE  and  CEEP, 
the  European  Centre  for  Public  Enterprises,  known  as  the  "Val  Duchesse-
meetings".  In  1985  the  parties,  despite  generally  divergent  positions,  were 
able to agree on a  non-binding declaration of intent regarding the introduction 
of  new  technologies. 
In the declaration it is stated,  inter alia,  that "the participants stress the 
need to motivate staff at all levels of responsibility in firms  and to develop 
their  aptitude  to  change,  inter  alia,  by  means  of  good  information  and 
consultation practices  ...  Both  sides  take  the  view  that,  when  technological 
changes which  imply major consequences for the workforce are introduced in the 
firm,  workers and/or their representatives should be  informed and consulted in 
accordance  with  the  laws,  agreements  and  practices  in  force  in  the  Community 
countries." 
61  Directive no.  89/391/EEC,  OJ  No.  L  183  of  29.6.1989. 
62  The  1983  Vredeling proposal,  article 4,  2  (c). 
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 EC  proposals and measures on employee participation64  ANNEX  II 
Measure  Companies  Form of  Type of employee  Subjects covered  Status 
affected  representation  involvement 
Draft Fifth  Public limited  Employee  Employee  All issues dealt with by  Obligatory. 
Directive (1972)  liability  representatives on an  representatives acting  supervisory board. 
companies with  obligatory supervisory  as full board members. 
overSOO  board. 
employees. 
Draft Fifth  Public limited  Choice between:  1  I and 21 One-third to  In all cases, regular  Obligatory. 
Directive (1983)  liability  11 employee  one-half employee  information and 
companies with  representatives on a  representatives acting  consultation on all 
over 1,000  supervisory board;  as full board members.  aspects of  the company's 
employees.  21 employee  3llnformation and  situation. progress, 
representatives as  consultation rights  prospects etc, and such 
supervisory non- analagous to those of  information as requested. 
executive members of  board-level 
a single board;  representatives; 
31 an employee only  4)1nformation and 
company-level  consultation rights 
representative body;  analagous to one of  the 
4) a collectively  above. 
agreed procedure 
analagous to one of 
the above. 
Draft ·vredeling•  Multinational  Existing employee  Information and  Regular information on  Obligatory. 
Directive (1980)  and national  representatives by law  consultation.  wide range of economic, 
firms with  or practice (except  financial, business and 
subsidiaries  those on company  employment issues. 
employing 100  boards).  Consultation on decisions 
or more workers.  likely to affect employees' 
interests. 
Draft ·vredeling·  Firms with at  Existing employee  Information and  Less frequent information  Obligatory. 
Directive (1983)  least 1,000  representatives by law  consultation.  on narrower range of 
employees in  or practice (except  issues than 1980 version. 
subsidiaries or  those on company  Consultation on decisions 
undertakings in  boards).  likely to affect employees'  .  the EC.  interests  . 
Draft European  ·european  11 Employee  11 Employee  1  I All issues dealt with by  Optional. 
Company Statute  Companies· set  representatives on an  representatives acting  supervisory board (all  Only applies 
(1975}  up under EC law.  obligatory supervisory  as full board members;  issues relevant to the  to 
board;  21 Co-determination,  management and  organisations 
21 A European Works  consultation and  progress of the  which decide 
Council made up of  information.  company);  to form a 
employee  21 Co-determination on  European 
representatives.  some employment- Company. 
related issues. 
Consultation on 
important management 
board decisions. 
Information on 
employment. production 
and investment issues. 
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- 38  -(cont.) 
Measure  Companies  Form of  Type of employee  Subjects covered  Status 
affected  representation  involvement 
Draft European  -european  Choice between:  1) and 2) employee  1) and 2) Supervision  Optional. 
Company Statute  Companies- set  1) employee  representatives acting  over management board/  Only applies 
(1989}  up under EC law.  representatives on a  as full board members;  executives. Three- to 
supervisory board;  3) Information and  monthly information on  organisations 
21 employee  consultation rights  management and  which decide 
representatives as  analagous to those of  progress of company,  to form a 
supervisory non- board-level  plus other important  European 
executive members of  representatives;  information as matters  Company. 
a single board;  4)1nformation and  arise and as requested; 
3) an employee only  consultation rights  3) Information as above. 
company-level  analagous to one of the  and consultation on 
' 
representative body;  above.  important decisions; 
4) a collectively  4) Information and 
agreed procedure.  consultation as in 3. 
-eouective  All undertakings  Existing employee  Information and  Information on planned  Obligatory. 
Redundancies- (except public  representatives by law  consultation.  collective redundancies. 
Directive  bodies).  or practice.  Consultation on means of 
avoiding or mitigating 
redundancies. 
-rransferof  All undertakings.  Existing employee  Information and  Information on details of  Obligatory. 
undertakings- representatives by law  consultation  a transfer of 
Directive  or practice (except  undertakings. 
those on company  Consultation on 
boards).  measures envisaged 
relating to the 
employees. 
Health and  safety  All undertakings  Existing employee  Information.  Information on risks and  Obligatory. 
-framework- (except some  representatives by law  consultation and  measures. Consultation 
Directive  public services).  or practice with  participation.  on all H & S questions. 
specific responsibility  Participation in 
for health and safety  discussions on H & Sin 
matters.  accordance with national 
law or practice. 
Draft Directive on  All undertakings  1  I A European Works  Information and  1) As established by  Procedures 
European Works  or groups with at  Council made up of  consultation.  collective agreement;  initiated at 
Councils (1990}  least 1,000  members elected/  2) Annual information  request of any 
employees in the  appointed by existing  meeting with  employees or 
EC. and at least  employee  management on progress  their repre-
two  representatives (or in  and prospects of  sentatives, 
establishments  their absence by  business. Consultation on  or by 
in different  employees) or  proposals likely to have  management. 
Member States  2) Some other  serious consequences for 
with at least 100  arrangement with  employees' interests. 
employees each.  employee 
or at least two  representatives 
group  meeting minimum 
undertakings in  requirements. 
different 
Member States.  . 
each employing 
at least 100. 
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